# Radical Democracy AC

### Framing

**Moral arguments always terminate in assertions.** **MACINTYRE 84**[[1]](#footnote-1)

The most influential account of moral reasoning that emerged in response to this critique of emotivism was one according to which an agent can only justify a particular judgment by referring to some universal rule from which it may be logically derived, and can only justify that rule in turn by deriving it from some more general rule or principle; but on this view **[S]ince every chain of reasoning must be finite, such a process of justificatory reasoning must always terminate with the assertion of some rule or principle for which no further reason can be given.** ‘Thus a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effect of observing those principles.  **If [I]** the enquirer still goes on **ask** ing **‘But why should I live like that?’** then there is no further answer to give him, because we have already, ex hypothesi, [we have already] said everything that could be included in the further answer.’ (Hare 1952, p. 69). **The terminus of justification is** thus **always**, on this view, **a not further to be justified choice**, a choice unguided by criteria. **Each individual** implicitly or explicitly **has to adopt his or her own first principles on the basis of such a choice. The utterance of any universal principle is in the end an expression of the preferences of an individual will and** for that will **its principles** have and **can have only such authority as it chooses to confer upon them by adopting them.**

Thus, absolute moral assertions are non-sensical. There is no rule that can be applied to all. So,

#### We must always be aware that there is a possibility of disagreement and failure. Denying this denies the basis of morality itself. Hagglund 06:

Hagglund, Martin. 2006. “The Necessity of Discrimination: Disjoining Derrida and Levinas.” *diacritics* 34 (1): 40–71.

The utopian dream of peace pervades Cornell's book and is symptomatic of her misconception of the deconstructive thinking of alterity. As I have argued, the notion of a nonviolent relation to the other is based on a suppression of alterity, since it must presuppose that the other is not violent in its turn and consequently denies the radical unpredictability of the other. Only if one assumes that the other is primarily peaceful does it make sense to prescribe a nonviolent relation, since the command to "respect" the alterity of the other does not make any sense if the other wants to destroy me. More? over, the dream of a community without violence is the dream of a community in which there would be nothing other than peace, excluding anyone or anything that does not want to engage in the "ethical" relation. Hence, the supposedly ethical dream is unethical on its own terms, since it dreams of eliminating the susceptibility to radical alterity, which cannot be dissociated from the susceptibility to violence and the concomitant attempts to combat it

**This justifies that we engage in agonism in order to preserve a plurality of views and accept the possibility of conflict. Mouffe 2k**

Mouffe  (Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”)

With its insistence on the irreducible alterity that represents both a condition of possibility and a condition of impossibility of every identity, **a perspective informed by post-structuralism provides** **a** much better theoretical **framework to grasp** the specificity of **modern democracy** than rationalist approaches. The notion of the 'constitutive outside' forces us to come to terms with the idea that **pluralism implies** the **permanence of conflict and antagonism**. Indeed, it helps us to understand that **conflict and division are not** to be seen as **disturbances that** unfortunately **cannot be** completed **eliminated**, or as empirical impediments that render impossible the full realization of a good constituted by a harmony that we cannot reach because we will never be: completely able to coincide with our rational universal self. Thanks to the insights of post-structuralism the project of **radical** and plural **democracy** is able to **acknowledge[s]** that **difference is the condition of the possibility** of constituting unity and totality at the same time that it provides their essential limits. In such a view, plurality cannot be: eliminated; it becomes irreducible. **We have** therefore **to abandon** **the** very **idea of a complete reabsorption of alterity** **into** **oneness** and harmony. It is an alterity that cannot be: domesticated, but as Rodolphe Gasch~ indicates: 'forever undermines, but also makes possible, the dream of **autonomy achieved through** a reflexive **coiling upon self**, since **it names the precondition of** such **a desired state**, a precondition **that represents** the **limit of** such a **possibility'**. Contrary to other projects of radical or participatory democracy informed by a rationalistic framework, radical and plural democracy rejects the very possibility of a non-exclusive public sphere of rational argument where a non-coercive consensus could be attained. By showing that such a consensus is a conceptual impossibility, it does not put in jeopardy the democratic ideal, as some would argue. On the contrary, **it protects pluralist democracy against any attempts at closure**. Indeed, such a **rejection constitutes** an important **guarantee that the dynamics of the democratic process will be** **kept** alive.

**Thus, the standard is engagement in agonism.**

**Prefer additionally:**

**1. Agonism controls the ability for us to engage in activism to solve oppression.** Harrigan 08 (Casey, Associate Director of Debate at UGA, Master’s in Communications – Wake Forest U., “A Defense of Switch Side Debate”, Master’s thesis at Wake Forest, Department of Communication, May, pp.43-45)

The Relevance Of Argumentation For Advancing Tolerant Politics Cannot Be Underestimated. The **willingness to be open to alternative views has** a material **impact on difference** in at least two primary ways. First, the **rendering of a certain belief as “off limits” from debate** and the prohibition of ideas from the realm of contestation **is** conceptually **indistinct from** the **physical exclusion of people** from societal practices. Unlike racial or gendered concerns, certain groups of people (the religious, minority political parties, etc.) are defined almost exclusively by the arguments that they adhere to. To deem these views unspeakable or irrelevant is to functionally deny whole groups of people access to public deliberation. Second, argument, as individual advocacy, is an expression of belief. It has the potential to persuade members of the public to either support or oppose progressive politics. Belief itself is an accurate indicator of the way individuals will chose to act—with very real implications for openness, diversity and accommodation. Thus, as a precursor to action, argument is an essential starting point for campaigns of tolerance. Argumentative pluralism can be defined as the proper tolerance for the expression of a diversity of ideas (Scriven 1975, p. 694). Contrary to monism, pluralism holds that there are many potential beliefs in the world and that each person has the ability to determine for himself or herself that these beliefs may hold true. Referring back to the opening examples, a pluralist would respect the right for the KKK to hold certain beliefs, even if he or she may find the group offensive. In the argumentative context,pluralism requires that participants to a debate or discussion recognize the right of others to express their beliefs, no matter how objectionable they may be. **The key** here **is expression**: although certain beliefs may be more “true” than others in the epistemic sense, **each should have equal access** (at least initially) **to forums of deliberation**. It is important to distinguish pluralism from its commonly confused, but only loosely connected, counterpart, relativism. To respect the right of others to hold different beliefs does not require that they are all considered equal. Such tolerance ends at the intellectual level of each individual being able to hold their own belief. Indeed, as Muir writes, “It [pluralism] implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs” (288). Thus, while a pluralist may acknowledge the right for the Klan to hold exclusionary views, he or she need not endorse racism or anti-Semitism itself, or the right to exclude itself. Even when limited to such a narrow realm of diversity, argumentative pluralism holds great promise for a politics based on understanding and accommodation that runs contrary to the dominant forces of economic, political, and social exclusion. Pluralism requires that **individuals** acknowledge opposingbeliefs and arguments by forcing an understanding thatpersonalconvictions are not universal. Instead of blindly asserting a position as an “objective truth,” advocates tolerate a multiplicity of perspectives, allowing a more panoramic understanding of the issue at hand (Mitchell and Suzuki 2004, p. 10). In doing so, the advocates frequently understand that there are persuasive arguments to be had on both sides of an issue. As a result, instead of advancing a cause through moralistic posturing or appeals to a falsely assumed universality (which, history has shown, frequently become justifications for scape-goating and exclusion), these proponents become purveyors of reasoned arguments that attempt to persuade others through deliberation. A clear example of this occurs in competitive academic debate. **Switch-side debating has profound implications for pluralism**. Personal convictions are supplemented by conviction in the process of debate. Instead of being personally invested in the truth and general acceptance of a position, debaters use arguments instrumentally, as tools, and as pedagogical devices in the search for larger truths. Beyond simply recognizing that more than one side exists for each issue, switch-side debate advances the larger cause of equality by fostering tolerance and empathy toward difference. **Setting aside** their own **“ego-identification,” students realize** that **they must listen and understand** **their opponent’s** arguments well enough **to become advocates on behalf of them** in future debates (Muir 1993, p. 289). Debaters assume the position of their opponents and understand how and why the position is constructed as it is. As a result, they often come to understand that a strong case exists for opinions that they previously disregarded. Recently, advocates of switch side debating have taken the case of the practice a step further, arguing that it, “originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes” (English, Llano, Mitchell, Morrison, Rief and Woods 2007, p. 224). Debating practices that break down exclusive, dogmatic views may be one of the most robust checks against violence in contemporary society.

#### 2. My framework is key to any productive discourse that would allow for the recognition of a true ethical theory. We must acknowledge that there is legitimacy to any view in order to prevent material violence.

**3. Universal approaches are always doomed to fail- takes out Hobbes NC’s. Mouffe 2** (Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. 2000. “Wittengstein, Political Theory, and Democracy”)

According to the contextualists, **liberal democratic "principles" cannot be seen as providing the unique and definite answer** to the question of what is the "good regime" **but only as defining one possible political "language game" among others.** **Since they do not provide the rational solution to the problem of human coexistence, it is futile to search for arguments in their favour** which would not be "context-dependent" in order to secure them against other political languages games. Envisaging the issue according to a Wittgensteinian perspective brings to the fore the inadequacy of all attempts to give a rational foundation to liberal democratic principles by arguing that they would be chosen by rational individuals in idealized conditions like the »veil of ignorance« (RAWLS) or the »ideal speech situation« (HABERMAS). As Peter WINCH has indicated with respect to RAWLS, the "veil of ignorance" that characterizes his position runs foul of WITTGENSTEIN's point that what is "reasonable" cannot be characterized independently of the content of certain pivotal "judgements". 7 For his part Richard RORTY – who proposes a "neo-pragmatic" reading of Wittgenstein – has affirmed, taking issue with APEL and HABERMAS, that **it is not possible to derive a universalistic moral philosophy** from the philosophy of language. There is nothing, for him, in the nature of language that could serve as a basis for justifying to all possible audiences the superiority of liberal democracy. He declares that »**We should have to abandon the hopeless task of finding politically neutral premises,** premises which can be justified to anybody, from which to infer an obligation to pursue democratic politics«. 8 He considers that envisaging democratic advances as if they were linked to progresses in rationality is not helpful and that we should stop presenting the institutions of liberal western societies as the solution that other people will necessarily adopt when they cease to be »irrational« and become »modern«. Following WITTGENSTEIN, he sees the question at stake not as one of rationality but of shared beliefs. To call somebody irrational in this context, he states, »is not to say that she is not making proper use of her mental faculties. It is only to say that she does not seem to share enough beliefs and desires with one to make conversation with her on the disputes point fruitful«. 9

#### Impact Calc:

#### The standard is concerned with the procedurals of increasing avenues for agonistic discourse, not end consequences. Mouffe 3:

Mouffe  (Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”)

To avoid any confusion, I should specify that, contrary to some postmodern thinkers who envisage a pluralism without any frontiers, I do not believe that a democratic pluralist politics should [not] consider as legitimate all the demands formulated in a given Society. The pluralism that I advocate requires discriminating between demands, which are to be accepted as part of the agonistic debate and those, which are to be excluded. A democratic Society cannot treat those who put its basic institutions into question as legitimate adversaries. The agonistic approach does not pretend to encompass all differences and to overcome all forms of exclusions. But exclusions are envisaged in political and not in moral terms. Some demands are excluded, not because they are declared to be’ 'evil', but because they challenge the institutions constitutive of the democratic political association. To be sure, the very nature of those institutions is also part of the agonistic debate, but, for such a debate to take place, the existence of a shared symbolic space is necessary**.** This is what I meant when I argued in Chapter 2 that democracy requires a 'conflictual consensus': consensus on the ethico-political values of liberty and equality for all, dissent about their interpretation. A line should therefore be drawn between those who reject those values outright and those who, while accepting them, fight for conflicting interpretations.

### Advocacy

I define housing as provide space for; accommodate. (google dictionary).

My advocacy text is that the United States should guarantee the right to housing all discourse on college campuses by rejecting all regulations. The resolution does not specify what we are housing or where to house it, meaning I have interpretive leeway on this issue.

**ACLU is the solvency advocate.** <https://www.aclu.org/hate-speech-campus>

**Many universities**, under pressure to respond to the concerns of those who are the objects of hate, **have adopted codes or policies prohibiting speech that offends** any group based on race, gender, ethnicity, religion or sexual orientation. **That's the wrong response, well-meaning or not.** The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects speech no matter how offensive its content. **Speech codes adopted by government-financed state colleges and universities amount to government censorship,** in violation of the Constitution. **And the ACLU believes that all campuses should adhere to First Amendment principles because academic freedom is a bedrock of education in a free society.**

### Offense

#### We recognize that each individual’s beliefs are legitimate through agonism. MOUFFE 4:

(Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”)

I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'ddiberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that **through rational** deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where **decisions would be taken that are equal**ly in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. **we should acknowledge** and valorize **the diversity of** ways in which the **'democratic** **game'** can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. **This would mean fostering** a **plurality** of forms of being a democratic citizen **and** **creating** the **institutions that would make it possible to follow** the **democratic rules** in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that **there cannot be one single best**, more 'rational' way to obey those rules and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. 'Following a rule', says Wittgenstein, 'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And it cannot be resolved, pace the rationalists, by claiming that there is a correct understanding of the rule that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But **space needs to be provided for** the many **different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed**. And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms and such a **diversity**, far from being a danger for democracy, **is** in fact **its** very **condition of existence**. This will of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But **this** struggle **will not be** one **between 'enemies'** but among 'adversaries', since **all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones. Such** an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call **'agonistic pluralism', is** unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by **necessity**. tcods to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.

**Implications:**

**a) Agonism demands that we allow and recognize all positions as legitimate. This means censorship is never justifiable since censorship relies on the assumption that some viewpoint is not legitimate enough to be voiced. Pohlhaus at al 2.** Using Wittgenstein Critically: A Political Approach to Philosophy Author(s): Gaile Pohlhaus and John R. Wright  Insofar as a plurality of positions can be accommodated within the 'we' through which individuals can lay claim to an intelligible voice, the 'we' and the language games we play are affirmed in their legitimacy. On the other hand, **insofar as what 'we say' forecloses in advance the acknowledgment of certain individuals as competent speakers of our language, then 'we' put into question our intelligibility to ourselves.** This situation parallels the claim to a private language insofar as our answerability to others would be artificially delimited and our intelligibility to ourselves would be made to seem, in this regard, effortless. Like the individual entertaining the idea of a private lan­guage, 'we' ignore the grounds of our collective intelligibility to others and to ourselves when we deny our dependence, in raising any sort of claim, on an open-ended public language. We will call this the 'extended private language argument'. **Taking the skeptical 'threat' seriously, by this argument, is part of maintaining a commitment to a genuinely open-ended 'we' as a ground to mutual intelligibility**, because not doing so would be to set limits, in advance, on who we will regard as a competent speaker. **For example, say a group's use of 'justice' involves claiming without irony that "justice was served" in situations involving racial minorities whenever they have been punished more harshly than nonminorities** would be for an equivalent crime. Confronted with this group, one might want to say to these people that they are twisting the term to suit their purposes of maintaining a racist social order; yet perhaps when this is pointed out, they persist in claim­ing that they really are 'doing justice'. **If we claim, then, that "they evidently don't know what justice means," one possible response open to them is sim­ply to say, "perhaps *you* don't know what it means, but this is what *we* say** . . . " Any demands put to the racist group to use the term consistently can easily be deflected by an obstinate appeal to the 'real meaning' of the term. As invoked in this situation, **those who object that "that's not what justice means" can be branded as incompetent speakers with a shrug from a member of the racist group.** We are then at a stalemate, at least about our language. The force of the extended private language argument is to show us that **in refusing answerability, both non-racists and the racist group are alienated from their intelligibility** to themselves through the language in which they try to express themselves. In other words, by saying that they do not have to answer as to whether they have correctly applied 'justice', the racists have drawn into question their own ability to meaningfully describe themselves as `just' . Of course, they may altogether lack concern about whether others take them to be employing the concept of justice intelligibly. In fact, they may deliberately wish to isolate themselves from those who deny their use of the term. However, through the racists' continuing use of this term, the relatively non-racist use of 'justice' is likewise challenged. **The responsibility of non-racists is to receive this challenge, to contest the racist use, to work to reestablish intelligibility.**

#### b) Topicality and theory are not reasons to reject my advocacy. They justify why certain interpretations might be better or worse, but rejecting a position’s ability to be heard is never permissible.

#### Censorship is deconstructive and regressive and turns any criticism – blocking the freedom of speech will only guarantee the domination of current prevailing discursive practices. Ward 90

( David V. Ph.D. Professor of Philosophy at Widener University in Pennsylvania. “Library Trends” Philosophical Issues in Censorship and Intellectual Freedom, Volume 39, Nos 1 & 2. Summer/Fall 1990. Pages 86-87) Second, even if the opinion some wish to censor is largely false, it may contain some portion of truth, a portion denied us if we suppress the speech which contains it. The third reason for allowing free expression is that any opinion “however true it may be, if it is not fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, ... will be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth” (Mill, 1951, p. **126).** Merely believing the truth is not enough, Mill points out, for even a true opinion held without full and rich understanding of its justification is “a prejudice, a belief independent of, and proof against, argument-this is not the way in which truth ought to be held by a rational being. This is not knowing the truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more, accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth” (p. **127).** Fourth, the meaning of a doctrine held without the understanding which arises in the vigorous debate of its truth, “will be in danger of being lost, or enfeebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct the dogma becoming a mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, but cumbering the ground, and preventing the growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, from reason or personal experience” (p. 149). Censorship, then, is undesirable according to Mill because, whether the ideas censored are true or not, the consequences of suppression are bad. Censorship is wrong because it makes it less likely that truth will be discovered or preserved, and it is wrong because it has destructive consequences for the intellectual character of those who live under it. Deontological arguments in favor of freedom of expression, and of intellectual freedom in general, are based on claims that people are *entitled* to freely express their thoughts, and to receive the expressions made by others, quite independently of whether the effects of that speech are desirable or not. These entitlements take the form of rights, rights to both free expression and access to the expressions of others.

**Censorship on college campuses is being used to stifle democratic thought itself. Sevcenko 16** <https://www.thefire.org/email-congress-about-campus-censorship-today/>

Nevertheless**, colleges and universities have stifled political debate on campus** on numerous occasions, especially advocacy for a particular candidate, on the mistaken ground that if Students for [Insert Candidate’s Name Here] is allowed to advocate on campus, the school will lose its tax-exempt status and likely be put out of business.

Educational institutions are, understandably, extremely careful not to do anything that might jeopardize their tax-exempt status. **The IRS is equally zealous in making sure that institutions who have this benefit adhere to the rules needed to maintain it. So the incentive for schools to take a “better safe than sorry” approach to the regulations is high—even if it means censoring student speech.**

**Allowing for freedom of discussion solves better for issues of hate speech. ACLU 2** Where racist, sexist and homophobic speech is concerned, the ACLU believes that **more speech -- not less -- is the best revenge. This is particularly true at universities, whose mission is to facilitate learning through open debate and study**, and to enlighten. Speech codes are not the way to go on campuses, where **all views are entitled to be heard, explored, supported or refuted.** Besides, **when hate is out in the open, people can see the problem. Then they can organize effectively to counter** bad attitudes, possibly change them, and forge solidarity against the forces of intolerance.

#### Discussions of reform from hegemony of discourse to agonism. MOUFFE 5:

(Chantal Mouffe, Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute for Advanced Studies. June 2000. “The Democratic Paradox”)

**The current hegemony of juridical discourse is defended and theorized by people** like Ronald Dworkin, **who asserts the primacy of the independent judiciary,** **presented as the interpreter of the political morality of a community.** **According to Dworkin, the fundamental questions facing a political community in the fields of unemployment, education, censorship, freedom of association, and so forth,** are better resolved by the judges, providing that they interpret the constitution by refer- ence to the principle of political equality. Very little is left for the political arena.

### Underview

#### 1] Presumption flows aff because of structural skews. Out of 32,000 rounds, affs won 7% fewer rounds. Prefer theoretical to substantive presumption arguments since presumption only matters once substance is irresolvable meaning substantive presumption is incoherent.

#### 2] Working within the state is not a form of complacency within violence, but rather provides a means of understanding the state and breaking it down. Zanotti 14 Dr. Laura Zanotti is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Virginia Tech. Her research and teaching include critical political theory as well as international organizations, UN peacekeeping, democratization and the role of NGOs in post-conflict governance.“Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World” – Alternatives: Global, Local, Political – vol 38(4):p. 288-304,. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – The Stated “Version of Record” is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013. Obtained via Sage Database. By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and **contingent struggles** that are constituted **within** the scripts of **government**al **rationalities** and at the same time exceed and **transform them**. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. **Government**ality **as a heuristic** focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also **foster** an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83 Such ethics of engagement would not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine ‘‘freedom’’ to be regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense processes of reflexivity **on the consequences** of political choices. To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault ‘‘my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. *So* **my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and pessimistic activism.***’’84*

#### 3] I define ought as a moral obligation by Merriam Webster. Contestations of the definition, however, are still ultimately irrelevant because my advocacy would frame your ability to contest the AC anyways.

#### 4] This aff is completely fair:

1. You have access to hate speech and violence based NC’s, politics DA’s, K’s of my method, etc. The arguments in the literature on this issue exist and there is ground on both sides
2. I have a definition of housing that implicates that I can defend housing this way and a solvency advocate that advocates for a specific aff. Any claims about not being able to specify are problems with the resolution wording, not the AC.
3. Not inherent which solves all the abuse.

#### 5] No action can have an effect on utility in an infinite universe.

**Bostrom,***Nick, Professor of Philosophy – Oxford University, “Infinite Ethics." 2009.*“Recent cosmological **evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite**. Moreover, if the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets then **there is,** with probability one, **an infinite number of people**. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc.” Bostrom 2 continues: “Suppose the world contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that a canonically **[such a]** infinite **world contains an infinite quantity of positive** value **and** an infinite quantity of **negative value**. This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We **[But we] can do only a finite amount of good or bad**. Yet in cardinal arithmetic, adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity**. Every possible act** of ours therefore has the same net effect on the total amount of good and bad in a canonically infinite world: none whatsoever. Aggregative **consequentialist theories** are [thus] threatened by infinitarian paralysis: they seem to **imply that** if the world is canonically infinite then **it is always ethically indifferent** what we do. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause another holocaust or prevent one from occurring. If any non‐contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.”

Thus consequentialism fails as a moral theory since it cant guide action, this is terminal defense.

#### 6] T should be a question of reasonability, so if you can still engage the aff, reject their framework arguments.

1. norm creation’s infinitely regressive -debate will never be perfect, empirically proven since people keep reading T
2. There are multiple legitimate interpretations of the topic and the aff goes into the round with no knowledge of 1NC strategy. I had to choose between mutually exclusive interps and the neg can always read T so don’t punish me for having to set grounds.
3. Competing interps creates a race to the bottom where debaters are forced to debate the most fair or educational practices which leads to one debate total

1. Alasdair MacIntyre “After Virtue” 1984 Notre Dame Press [↑](#footnote-ref-1)